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Abstract:  
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has resulted in societal alienation between both conflicting 
parties. In some contexts, such as trade, cooperation continues. We provide a micro-level 
analysis of economic interactions between Israeli and Palestinian fruit and vegetable traders in 
order to shed light on how institutions in agricultural markets and food trade work subject to 
fierce political conflict. A unique dataset enables insights into institutions and agents’ 
perceptions of this economic exchange. Israeli-Palestinian trading patterns are found to be 
mostly informal and surprisingly extensive. Education and personal social networks appear to 
be key facilitation factors. Israeli traders do not feel affected by the conflict, but wish for a 
quick resolution. The few transaction problems reported are mainly caused by the political 
situation and payment behaviour. Despite the on-going conflict, daily contact between 
economic agents has lead to continuous economic cooperation and has improved the 
perception of the partners from the other party.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The ongoing political conflict between Israel and the Palestinian Territories results in an 
increasing physical separation and societal alienation of both conflicting parties. Since 2002, 
Israel has implemented a variety of security policies in consequence of the Second Intifada. 
The resulting improvement of the security situation in Israel has been accompanied by 
increased challenges regarding the living conditions in the Palestinian Territories resulting 
from comprehensive restrictions to the movement of people and goods. In addition to the 
physical impediments created by the security policies, legislation is a decisive factor. By law, 
Israelis are not allowed to enter Area A1 of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (WORLD BANK 
2007: 4). Palestinians need to apply for a permit to enter Israel. Physical separation and entry 
restrictions led to societal alienation and ethnic and political polarization between both 
conflicting parties causing, among other consequences, a decline of economic interactions. 
MASELLA (2013) and ESTEBAN (2007) find that Israel belongs to the countries with the 
strongest polarization between domestic ethnic groups. Consequently, polarization between 
the majority of Israeli citizens, which are Jewish, and Palestinians is likely to be even more 
pronounced because these two groups rival with each other in many aspects.  
 
Regarding trade the situation appears to be different. As Israel is the most important trading 
partner for the Palestinian Territories, economic exchange continues to exist despite the 
conflict. While trade between the two parties is characterized by a unilateral dependence of 
the Palestinian Territories on Israel, the Palestinian Territories are also an important partner 
for Israeli food trade. Relationships between Israeli and Palestinian traders are challenged 
substantially by the conflict and the consequent movement restrictions. There is extremely 
limited information on the institutional framework of trade between Israelis and Palestinians.  
Our aim consists of analysing the institutional framework of food trade between Israel and the 
Palestinian Territories which is heavily impeded by the political framework. We inquire into 
how trading relations are influenced by the conflict, and which factors promote their existence 
and continuation. In particular, we aim to provide an analysis of traders’ networks by 
considering the attitudes of Israeli traders regarding trade with Palestinians, trade patterns, 
and transaction problems. 
 
In the context of the Middle East, this case study of economic interdependencies on the one 
side and violent conflict and political polarization on the other contributes to the political 
theory of liberal peace. This theory postulates that economically important trade will “reduce 
conflict because inter-state violence adversely affects commerce, prospectively or 
contemporaneous” (HEGRE et al. 2010: 771). Our results support the liberal theory of peace 
research, research which argues that economic interdependencies foster peace because 
conflict contradicts mutually beneficial economic relationships (ONEAL AND RUSSET 1997; 
POLACHEK AND XIANG 2010, etc.). We complement analyses such as FERSHTMAN AND 
GANDAL (1998) who estimate a sizable positive welfare effect for Israeli consumers due to 
increased economic activity resulting from mutual peace commitments, which they interpret 
as a “peace dividend”. GOERG et al. (2013) examine the willingness of cooperation between 
Israelis and Palestinians. They find that direct personal contact between individuals belonging 
to the different groups sharply improves the will for cooperation. 
 
To our knowledge, our analysis is one of the few studies providing comprehensive insights 
into trade insitutions subject to violent conflict from a micro-economic perspective. The focus 
on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict enables an opportunity to study economic interactions 
1 The West Bank is divided in three administrative units, namely Area A, B and C. Zone A covers 18% of the 
area of the West bank and is under full Palestinian civil and security control (B’TSELEM 2013: 6). 
                                                 
 
across the fierce ideological rifts of a long-lasting conflict of substantial international 
importance.  
 
In contrast to these previous studies, we focus on the institutional characteristics of real 
economic interdependencies between members of both sides of the conflict. It, therefore, 
provides additional insights, which complement trade data published by statistical offices. We 
explicitly consider the perceptions of the political situation, its causes, and its consequences 
and challenges for economic activities. This micro-level analysis concentrates on the trade of 
fruit and vegetables as this represents one of the few sectors with continuous and intensive 
economic Israeli-Palestinian interactions despite the long-lasting political conflict. The 
insights gained from this study complement the findings of WFP (2009), which assesses the 
effects of Israeli security policies on fruits and vegetable markets in the Palestinian 
Territories. 
 
The remainder of our paper is structured as follows: In section 2 we provide background 
information on food trade between Israel and the Palestinian Territories. Section 3 presents 
the empirical strategy and characterizes the sample. Section 4 presents the results of the 
quantitative survey conducted among Israeli wholesale traders, analyses trading patterns, and 
discusses in detail problems occurring during the transactions. Finally, in section 5 we 
summarize and draw conclusions. 
 
2 TRADE REALTIONSHIPS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIAN 
TERRITORIES 
As Israel and the Palestinian Territories constitute a tariff union only approximate data 
regarding the range of trade is available (PALTRADE & PERES CENTER FOR PEACE 2006: 24). 
Therefore, and due to the fact that the Israeli army controls nearly all borders of the 
Palestinian Territories, Israel is the most important trading partner for the Palestinians. In 
2011 Israel was the destination of roughly 86% of all Palestinian exports and the source of 
about 70% of all Palestinian imports. In contrast to this pattern, only 0.8% of all Israeli 
imports had their origin in the Palestinian Territories and 5.6% of all Israeli exports went to 
there (ICBS 2012a; PCBS 2013: 44f) which points to a pronounced asymmetric relationship.  
The Palestinian Territories are an important trading partner for fruits and vegetables for Israel. 
Israeli sales of fruit to the Palestinian Territories account for about 20% of total fruit exports 
(including citrus), and for about 30% of fruit exports not including citrus. Israeli vegetable 
exports to there are less important (6% of total exports, including potatoes and melons)2. The 
most traded fruits are bananas and apples. The Palestinian Territories export mainly 
vegetables to Israel, where cucumbers are the most exported product to Israel. Their share 
amounts to 50% of all exported vegetables (IHLE AND RUBIN 2013).  
 
The values of traded fruits and vegetables as well as their share in total trade from 1998 to 
2011 show comprehensive trading relationships between both conflict parties. Both 
Palestinian exports to Israel and imports from Israel to the Palestinian Territories decreased 
significantly as a result of the Second Intifada which indicates that the political conflict has 
the potential to influence trade and to impede the exchange of goods to a significant extent. 
Since the end of the Second Intifada in 2005, trade has been recovering again for Israeli 
exports to the Palestinian Territories more than for the Palestinian exports to Israel. There is a 
pronounced dependence of the Palestinian Territories on Israel discernable. 
 
 
2 Authors calculations for 2011 based on ICBS (2012a) and IMOA (2012). 
                                                 
 
 
 
Table 1: Trade with fruits and vegetables (mil US$) 
Year 
Exports from Pal. Ter. to 
Israel 
Imports to Pal. Ter. from 
Israel Period 
Total Fruits and vegetables Total 
Fruits and 
vegetables 
1998-
2000 550 
45 
(8.2%) 2450 
80 
(3.2%) 
Before Second 
Intifada 
2005 425 17.5 (4.1%) 
2350 
 
41 
(1.7%) 
End of Second 
Intifada 
2007 455 12.1 (2.6%) 2443 
54.6 
(2.2%) Post-Intifada 
2011 578 no data available 3572 no data available 
Notes:  The number in parentheses denotes the shares in the respective total quantities. 
Source:  Authors’ calculations based on PALTRADE & PERES CENTER FOR PEACE (2006) for 
1998-2000 and 2005, PCBS (2009) and PCBS (2011a) for 2007, ICBS (2012b) for 
2011. 
 
The violent escalation of the conflict during the Second Intifada from 2000 to 2005 has 
affected harshly both economies (see, e.g., ZUSSMAN et al. 2008). As a reaction, Israel has 
implemented various security measures in order to curb the resulting dangers for its 
population, which have various prolonged effects beyond the phase of escalation. The 
construction of the West Bank Barrier is the most prominent example (Figure 1). The aim of 
the barrier is to control the movement between Israel and the West Bank. Palestinians require 
a license for crossing the barrier. While increasing security in Israel, the barrier caused strong 
constraints for the Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank and curbed economic interactions 
between both sides. IHLE AND RUBIN (2013) provide evidence for that these security measures 
taken affected both of the Palestinian and the Israeli economies. The transport of goods by 
truck between Israel and the Palestinian Territories is channelled through commercial 
terminals (Figure 1).  Inside the West Bank, a diverse system of impediments including 
permanent and temporary checkpoints and different kinds of roadblocks are implemented 
depending on the security situation. Taken together the described security measures 
considerably challenge economic interactions because they result in increased transport times 
and costs as well as in a markedly incresed degree of risk and uncertainty for Palestinian and 
Israeli wholesale traders and for maintaining professional networks with the other party 
(WORD BANK 2008). 
  
Figure 1: Commercial terminals of the West Bank Barrier 
Source: UN OCHAOPT (2008). 
 
The literature only offers limited evidence on the institutional structure of food trade in 
situations of violent conflict in general and between Israel and the Palestinian Territories in 
particular. One exception is the study of the WFP (2009) which examines the trading 
relationships from a Palestinian perspective. The authors provide a comprehensive analysis of 
 
market structures, trading patterns, and problems faced in the economic transactions by 
focusing on the effects of movement restrictions for Palestinian traders. They find that 
importers from the West Bank buy their goods mainly on the central Israeli wholesale market 
in Tsrifin (Tel Aviv) or from producers in Israeli settlements in the West Bank. There are no 
substantial problems reported concerning the transport of the goods within the Palestinian 
Territories. Palestinian exporters from the West Bank (exports from the Gaza strip are largely 
banned since 2007) are much more affected by security measures than their importing 
colleagues. In particular, restricted opening hours of the commercial crossings and high 
transportation costs due to the use of alternative routes were reported. Palestinian exporters do 
not have possibilities for price negotiations with their Israeli buyers but they have a powerful 
position vis-à-vis their Palestinian suppliers. 
 
3 DATA 
We conducted a quantitative survey among Israeli fruit and vegetable wholesale traders. This 
unique dataset enables us to carry out detailed analyses on the scope and structure of personal 
economic interactions. From October to December 2011, 51 traders spread throughout the 
country were interviewed, of which 46 were suitable for analysis. In 2011, 144 wholesalers 
were registered by the IMOA (IMOA 2011b), but as in recent years licenses have not been 
enforced, so the total number is likely to be somewhat higher. Thus, our sample covers 
roughly one third of the population. Figure 2 depicts the locations of the survey with the 
number of interviewees. Most of the wholesaler shops are located in densely populated areas 
of Israel, that is, in Jerusalem, Tsrifin (close to Tel Aviv), Haifa, and Rehovot. The survey 
was conducted in Hebrew and mainly by face-to-face interviews and a lottery incentive of 
around 100 € for participation was offered. Out of the population of 144 registered 
wholesalers 80 traders were asked to take part in the survey and 46 completed the 
questionnaire.  
 
The response rate RR1 for the whole survey amounted to 32% (AAPOR 2009). A possible 
selection bias is an important factor to be considered. Survey participants might have been 
more open and cooperative with Palestinians than other traders not surveyed, because traders 
frequently refused to participate due to a widespread mistrust against authorities in Israel and 
the fact that they were unwilling to speak about politics in the Israeli context. This indicates 
that potential interviewees might have refused to participate due to concerns about the 
political exploitation of their statements. Moreover, traders may have been suspicious due to 
their doubts about cooperation between the surveyors and governmental institutions on tax 
matters etc. Particularly during the beginning of the survey, these problems may have been 
the reason for low response rates, however, the issues were considered solved since sufficient 
responses of traders of were obtained later. 
 (4 (4))
(6 (12))
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Figure 2: Survey locations 
Notes:  In parentheses, the first number is the number of interviewed wholesalers in double 
parentheses is the total number of registered wholesalers.  
Source:  Authors based on PCBS (2011a: 3) and IMOA (2011b). 
 
Table 2 characterizes the sample of our study. Most of the wholesalers had been working for 
21 years or longer in their business; hence together they possessed a large amount of pooled 
experience. The business size range shows large variation; however, traders tended to judge 
the size of their business as average compared to their colleagues in the same market. Two 
thirds of the interviewed traders were Jewish Israelis, 26% were Muslims (implying Arab 
Israeli ethnicity), while 7% did not indicate their religion and, thus, closely resembles the 
entire Israeli population as well as its geographical concentration. Arab Israelis cluster in the 
north of the country. 
 
Table 2: Characterization of the sample 
Variable N Min Max Median Mean St. dev. 
Duration of employment in the 
wholesale business (years) 45 1 45 21 22.09 12.97 
Business size in comparison to 
trader colleagues in the same 
wholesale market* 
45 1 5 3 3.29 1.20 
Employed people in the business 
(incl. owner) 45 2 42 10 13.44 8.53 
Notes:  *Likert-Scale: 1 = “Clearly below average“; 3 = “Average“; 5 = “Clearly above 
average“. 
Source:  Authors’ calculations. 
 
 
Figure 3 displays the traders’ self-reported risk attitude graphed according to the sizes of their 
businesses and their experience. It does not provide any evidence that the wholesalers’ 
attitude towards risk is associated with his professional experience nor with the size of his 
company. The circle sizes do not appear to be correlated with a certain company size or 
amount of experience. 
 
 
Figure 3: Risk attitudes of wholesalers 
Notes:  The risk attitude is measured on a Likert-scale between 0 (“not at all willing to take 
risk”) and 10 (“very well willing to take risk”). The circle size is growing with the 
degree of risk affinity. 
Source:  Authors. 
 
4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
We examine first how Israeli traders assess the role of the conflict on their business activities 
(see Figure 4). Israeli wholesalers are clearly concerned about the conflict (item 
“indifferent”). However, they do not feel that their own businesses are impacted to a great 
extent as shown by the first two box plots. Interestingly, disagreement concerning the second 
item is slightly stronger indicating that the traders perceive negative spill-overs from the 
political situation onto their businesses. The third and fourth box plots confirm this finding. 
Traders strongly support a speedy resolution of the conflict (item "both suffer"). They value 
the general benefits for both sides slightly higher than their personal professional interest, 
which indicates their awareness of comprehensive societal impulses resulting from conflict’s 
resolution. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Professional experience (years) 
Number of employees 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Israeli traders’ perception of the effects of the political conflict 
Notes:  Likert-Scale: 5 = „Strongly agree”; 3 = „Neither agree nor disagree“; 1 = “Strongly 
disagree“. 
Source:  Authors’ calculations. 
 
4.1 Trade with Palestinians 
Thirty out of the 46 Israeli wholesalers (65%) stated that they are currently doing business 
with Palestinian trading partners. Twelve of the remaining 16 wholesalers used to trade with 
Palestinians in the past. All Muslim traders (Arab Israelis) and 48% of the Jewish Israelis 
have Palestinian partners. The majority (particularly Jewish Israelis) sells to Palestinian 
traders while a minority (only Arab Israelis) also buys from Palestinian colleagues in the West 
Bank. 
 
Figure 5 presents detailed insights into the reasons for and against such professional contacts. 
It shows the answers of Israeli wholesale traders concerning business relations with 
Palestinian counterparts depending on whether they currently trade with them (“yes”) or not 
(“no”). Sizable deviations between both groups can be observed. Compared to their 
colleagues not engaged in trade with Palestinians, many more of the Israeli traders having 
business contacts do not perceive Palestinians as unreliable (item 1).They also view such 
relationships less frequently as being too dangerous (item 3) or too risky (item 4). They also 
report having fewer bad experiences than the group without such contacts. Israeli traders 
without such links more often report not having any contacts to the Palestinian Territories 
(item 6). Item 2 (too many administrative difficulties to afford trade with Palestinians), item 5 
(refusal of collaboration with Palestinians on principle) and item 8 (low quality of Palestinian 
products) do not show noticeable differences between the two groups. This indicates that 
neither administrative difficulties nor refusal on principle are reasons not to trade with 
Palestinians. However, the quality of Palestinian products was criticized. In five of the eight 
items, the variation between the answers of the Israeli traders with existing connections – 
measured by the inter-quartile range (IQR) – is less spread than for the other group.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Evaluation of trade relationships with Palestinian partners 
Notes:  Likert-Scale: 5 = “Strongly agree”; 3 = “Neither agree nor disagree”; 1 = “Strongly 
disagree”. The bold line in the box plots denotes the median, the half-transparent 
circles mark the observations and the small black circles mark outliers outside 
beyond the rough 95% interval for the median of 1.58 * IQR/ N  (WICKHAM 2009). 
Graphics generated with R (R CORE TEAM 2013). 
Source:  Authors’ calculations. 
 
Table 3 shows the p-values of the tests for differences in the perceptions between Israeli 
traders with and without current business relationships with Palestinians. We employ a 
number of tests in order to obtain robust evidence on whether the evaluations between both 
groups of Israeli traders differ significantly. Since the measurements are ordinal (Likert-
scale), we employ nonparametric tests, which are independent of distributional assumptions of 
the data (compare, e.g. SIEGEL 1988).  
 
Table 3: P-values of difference tests on the perceptions of trade relations 
depending on current trade status 
 Item 1 
unreliable 
Item 2 
administrative 
effort 
Item 3 
dangerous 
Item 4 
too risky 
Item 5 
principal 
refusal 
Item 6 
no 
contacts 
Item 7 
bad 
experiences 
Item 8 
bad 
quality 
N 43 43 43 43 42 42 44 38 
Test  
Median 0.43 0.93 0.33 <0.01*** 0.30 0.13 0.03** 0.80 
Kolmogorov-
Smirnov 
0.10 0.55 0.31 <0.01*** 0.26 0.04** <0.01*** 0.92 
Whitney-
Mann 
0.11 0.26 0.05* <0.01*** 0.13 0.03** <0.01*** 0.30 
Notes:  One, two and three asterisk(s) denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, 
respectively.  
Source:  Authors’ calculations. 
 
Significant differences between traders with and without links to Palestinians in assessing 
relations with Palestinians become obvious. Traders without links are significantly more 
likely to perceive such relations as too dangerous (item 3) as indicated by the Whitney-Mann-
Test. There are pronounced differences between the two groups in their risk perception of 
such relationships and in the negative experiences they may have had with Palestinians. 
Moreover, they have significantly fewer contacts to the Palestinian Territories (item 6), which 
 
is supported by two of the three tests. Although items 1, 2, 5 and 8 do not show significant 
differences between the two groups, there is a slight tendency that Israelis engaged in trade 
with Palestinians have more positive opinions (items 1, 2 and 8). The group-specific answers 
to items 2 and 3 indicate that traders without existing contacts seem not to be concerned about 
trade frictions created by the conflict. 
 
The following logistic regressions model the probability of the existence of trading links 
between Israelis and Palestinians. Because of the small sample size, we consider robust 
standard errors and estimate it for each variable set separately.3 Variables potentially 
explaining the existence of active relationships are classified into four subgroups: personal 
characteristics, business characteristics, attitudes regarding the conflict, and personal 
experiences with and opinions about Palestinians. Table 4 reports the effects of personal 
characteristics.4 The level of education and the financial situation are significant at the 10%-
level. The better the education (financial situation) of the Israeli wholesaler the higher (lower) 
is the probability of being engaged in business with Palestinians. Risk behaviour, age and 
preference for the conservative Likud party do not exert significant impacts. These findings 
imply that increased personal openness and reduced uncertainty and prejudices due to higher 
education improve contacts. On the other hand, well-off Israeli traders seem to avoid the risks 
associated with business relations with Palestinians.  
 
Table 4: Factors influencing trade with Palestinians: personal characteristics 
Explanatory var. Description Coefficient Robust st. err. 
Constant  0.40 1.97 
Willingness to take risk 3 categories 0.02 0.69 
Financial situation  Dummy: 1= very / somewhat good -2.04* 1.17 
Age 4 categories -0.44 0.60 
Education 3 categories 1.61** 0.77 
Likud Dummy 1.66 1.76 
N = 35 
R²(McFadden)=0.29 
   
Notes:  One, two and three asterisk(s) denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. Willingness to take risk is measured on a scale from 0 to 10 and 
classified into three categories. Category 1 encompasses the degrees 0 to 3 on the 
scale and means “risk-averse”, category 2 degrees 4 to 6 (risk-neutral) and category 3 
degrees 7 to 10 and means “willing to take risk”. Education is classified into less 
than 12 years of schooling (category 1), 12 years of schooling (category 2), and more 
than 12 years of schooling (category 3). Age is classified in categories less than 41 
(category 1), 41 to 50 (category 2), 51 to 60 (category 3), and older than 60 (category 
4). 
Source:  Authors’ calculations. 
 
Table 5 shows the associations of the extent of personal social contacts to Palestinians and 
attitudes towards trade with them with the existence of a business relationship. While the 
3 The number of observations differs for each model as all available answers have been used, respectively. 
4 Several other specifications have been considered however without significant results. Especially the variable 
location of the Israeli wholesaler does not have explanatory power. This suggests that there is not a regional 
divide within Israel (since the Jewish and the Arab Israeli population appears to be clustered in certain parts of 
the country) regarding the existence of Israeli-Palestinian contacts. It also implies that Arab Israelis are not more 
likely to have such contacts.  
                                                 
 
private social network significantly favours business contacts, the perceptions of Palestinians 
constitute strong impulses against such relations. The more Palestinian friends the interviewed 
Israeli trader has the more probable is his engagement in trade with Palestinians. This is 
particularly the case for Arab Israelis since they belong to the same ethno-linguistic group as 
Palestinians.  
 
For the last two groups of variables (attitudes concerning the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and 
business characteristics) models have been estimated but the hypothesis that the coefficients 
are equal to zero could not be rejected. There is a tendency discernible that traders who agree 
that Palestinians suffer most from the conflict are more probable to trade with them, while 
traders who agree that only Palestinians are responsible for the lack of its solution are less 
probable of being engaged in trade with them. The bigger the shop and the longer the 
wholesaler has been working in his job the more probable is a business relationship with 
Palestinians. 
 
Table 5: Factors influencing trade with Palestinians: contacts and attitudes  
Explanatory variable Description Coefficient Robust 
st. error 
Constant  0.03 0.98 
Number of Palestinian Friends 4 categories 0.78** 0.35 
Unreliability of Palestinians Dummy: 1= strongly / rather agree -2.03* 1.12 
High risk of trade with 
Palestinians 
Dummy: 1= strongly / rather agree -3.17** 1.26 
N = 37 
R²(McFadden)=0.35 
   
Notes:  Meaning of asterisks as in Table 4. Number of Palestinian friends is classified in 
categories from 1= no friends; 2 = 1 to 5; 2 = 5.5 to 20 (answers such as “5-6” are 
coded as 5.5); 4= more than 20 (including answers like “many” or “all”). 
Source:  Authors’ calculations. 
 
Figure 6 shows the traders’ perceptions of the temporal development of the conditions 
resulting from the political framework towards business relationships with Palestinian 
counterparts.  Items 1a and 1b measure the recall of the state of these conditions by the traders 
before the Second Intifada (late 2000, networking in general vs. business activities in general) 
and item 2 the traders’ expectations for the end of 2016. Concerning all three aspects, traders 
with existing links appear to distinguish fewer obstacles for such contacts. This is evident as 
the median answers are higher for this group. They feel that the conditions did not change in 
the past (items 1) and will not in the future (item 2) in comparison to the present. Traders 
without existing contacts tend to evaluate both past and future conditions as more difficult 
than currently.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Evaluation of business relations with Palestinians in the past and 
  future 
Notes:  The answers on the Likert-Scale mean 5 = “Much easier”; 3 = “No difference”; 1 = 
“Much more difficult”. Otherwise the notes of Figure 5 apply. For the number of 
cases for each item see Table 6. 
Source:  Authors’ calculations. 
 
There is considerable variation within the memories of the conditions before the Second 
Intifada. A very high degree of accordance of negative expectations towards the future is 
found among traders without contacts while the IQR of the answers of Israeli traders with 
existing contacts remains constant. Wholesalers having links to Palestinians are significantly 
less pessimistic regarding the future. The p-values of the three non-parametric tests for 
differences in the perceptions between the two groups of traders in Table 6 show that in two 
of three cases only the perceptions regarding the future significantly differ. That is, traders 
with existing contacts have a statistically more optimistic outlook on the future regarding their 
business relationships with Palestinians.  
 
Table 6: Differences in the evaluation depending of the current existence of 
  trade relations 
 Item 1a Item 1b Item 2 
N 42 42 38 
Test  
Median 0.55 0.96 0.64 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 0.11 0.35      0.02*** 
Whitney-Mann 0.14 0.11      0.01*** 
Notes:  One, two and three asterisk(s) denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, 
respectively. 
Source:  Authors’ calculations. 
 
4.2 Trading network 
Figure 7 shows both the structure and the intensityof the Israeli-Palestinian trading network as 
reported by the Israeli wholesalers. The extent is characterized by more than 34 bilateral links 
between Israeli and Palestinian wholesale markets. Most connections exist to Jenin and 
Nablus each having five links of varying intensity to different Israeli markets. On the Israeli 
side, the markets in Tsrifin, Jerusalem and Nazareth have 12, 9 and 7 links, respectively, and 
 
are the most comprehensively connected. In five of the nine Israeli markets barely any 
contacts to Palestinian counterparts were reported.  
Based on the total 127 links between single Israeli Palestinian wholesalers, the intensity of the 
network can be deduced. Trade links were reported to be most intense within major 
population centres in the West Bank. These major centres are: Nablus (61% of Israeli traders 
engaged in trade with Palestinians have trading partners here), Ramallah (61%) and 
Bethlehem (57%), and Hebron (64%). These cities account for more than half of all contacts 
reported. In particular, traders located in Tsrifin and Jerusalem dominated these connections, 
accounting for 84% of traders. This is plausible given the importance of the former market for 
regional fruits and vegetables trade and the geographic proximity of the latter to the West 
Bank. For example, all Israeli traders who reported relationships with Palestinians had links 
both to Ramallah and to Bethlehem. Conversely, the Israeli markets of Tsrifin and Jerusalem 
are by far the most important partners for all Palestinian markets south of Nablus.  
 
Figure 7 Most intensive business contacts tend to be maintained with nearby districts. 
Especially traders from Tsrifin report trading with Palestinians from Gaza. Traders in 
Jerusalem especially maintain business connections with Palestinians from the neighbouring 
districts Ramallah, Bethlehem and Hebron. Similar to Jerusalem, traders from Tamra and 
Nazareth interact with Palestinians from neighbouring regions, that is, the northern part of the 
West Bank and the Jordan Valley.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Extent and intensity of Israeli- Palestinian trading relationships 
Notes:  The number in parentheses below the Israeli market names denotes the total number 
of its traders engaged in trade with Palestinians. The width of the line indicates the 
intensity of professional contacts between a pair of markets. Tsrifin is the central 
fruits and vegetables wholesale market of Israel located in the Tel Aviv Metropolitan 
Area where more than 3 million Israelis (about 40% of the entire population) live and 
to which also, e.g., Petah Tikwa and Rehovot belong. Nine Israeli and twelve 
Palestinian wholesale markets are considered. 
Source:  Authors based on PCBS (2011a: 3). 
 
Business with Palestinians consists mainly in an informal manner: it happens accidentally 
(N=10) or is based on oral agreements (N=13). In most of the cases the trading partners report 
meeting each other on the Israeli market (N=21) and confirming their agreement by a hand-
shake. Sometimes business with Palestinians is reported as being arranged by phone. 
Interviewees emphasize that products are only sold through cash payment. This finding 
corresponds with the study of WFP (2009) indicating that credit is granted to Palestinians less 
frequently. 
 
Israeli traders know only a little about transport of products traded with Palestinians because 
they are not actively engaged in the transport. This indicates that transport is mainly organized 
by the Palestinian partners. The information given is vague and it could be that products 
shipped on Israeli trucks may have originated from a back-to-back-procedure. Traders 
 
engaged in business with Palestinians were asked about their three most important Palestinian 
trading partners and about the products they trade most with these traders. Many more Israelis 
sell to Palestinians than buy from them. Fruits are exclusively sold to Palestinians while 
vegetables are traded in both directions. This pattern reflects the production pattern of both 
sides; Arab-Israeli traders in the northern cities (Nazareth, Tamra) buy specific vegetables. 
The mainly Arab-Israeli population living in this region has a certain demand for vegetables, 
which are traditionally used in the local diet, but rarely produced by Israeli agriculture.5 Most 
of the bought vegetables come from the northern part of the West Bank and the Jordan River 
area (main production areas in the West Bank). Surprisingly, traders did not particularly 
mention the exceptional role of cucumbers, which according to Israeli trade statistics account 
for half of the vegetables imported from the Palestinian Territories. This might indicate that 
Israeli canning factories process most of it and rely on other delivery channels.  
 
4.3 Problems with the trading relationship 
Only a few problems are reported to occur in the trading relationships. 25% of the Israelis 
engaged in trade with Palestinians stated that during the last six months problems in the 
trading relationships occurred often while 68% never or seldom experienced problems (7% 
did not answer the question). In total, 21 different problems were mentioned. One third of 
them refers to payment behaviour and one quarter to the effects of the West Bank Barrier 
occasional closures. Problems are most often related to the security and political situation. 
Traders mostly refer to security measures and closures of crossings. It is noticeable that 
especially Arab Israeli traders highlighted this kind of problem. In Tsrifin the lack of free 
entrance was criticized - not only for Palestinians to Israel but for Israelis to the Palestinian 
Territories as well. The second category of problems refers to the payment behaviour of 
Palestinian buyers, which can be further classified in payment delay and payment default. 
Especially, traders from Tsrifin, one trader from Jerusalem and one trader from Nazareth 
mentioned payment behaviour problems. Connected to this topic is the lack of access to the 
Palestinian Territories, which is mentioned by Arab Israelis. The third category of problems is 
related to prices of Palestinian products. As traders from Nazareth and Tamra are the only 
traders to buy products from Palestinians the problem is only of importance in this region. 
Palestinian exporters are able to obtain high prices for their products, because of very specific 
products with only few competitors. This indicates oligopolistic market structure. Further 
problems occasionally mentioned are the low quality of Palestinian products and rather 
general economic problems in Israel and the Palestinian Territories. 
 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
The unique dataset collected from Israeli fruits and vegetables wholesalers permits manifold 
insights into the institutional framework of the economic interactions with Palestinian 
counterparts which are subject to violent conflict. As the majority of the interviewed Israelis 
report doing business with Palestinians, we conclude that there is strong evidence of extensive 
professional networks, at least between the members of the parties of the conflict who work in 
the sector. Traders’ education and the extent of friendship contacts to Palestinians appear to 
be the most important factors favouring such relationships. This result seems plausible 
because education can be associated with openness of mind and curiosity for contacts to the 
“other side”. The social networks of the Israeli traders with Palestinians facilitate the 
overcoming of societal and social obstacles, which are otherwise likely to impede the 
establishment of such relationships. 
5 Among these is okra, a special variety of zucchini, which is used for stuffing, and other particular local 
varieties, e.g., the more tasty baladi breeds of zucchini, eggplants or peas and also fava beans for the preparation 
of the popular Arab dish of ful. 
                                                 
 
 
Israeli traders who have existing business relationships with Palestinians perceive such links 
as significantly less dangerous and risky. The general negative perception of professional 
contacts with Palestinians, which is quantified by these two attributes, represents two aspects 
of the implications of the conflict as perceived by the economic agents. On a personal level, it 
has to be assigned to fear and resentments originating from societal separation originating 
from the conflict. Societal separation is less prevalent for Israeli traders with existing 
Palestinian relations. Secondly, this negative view relates to the perception of an increased 
potential for frictions at the institutional level due to conflict-caused additional arrangements, 
e.g., security checks or movement limitations. These procedures are perceived as inhibiting 
economic activity and increasing the costs of the economic transactions. Furthermore, there is 
strong evidence that the traders with links to Palestinians have significantly more contacts to 
individuals of the other side of the conflict and experience their interactions with Palestinian 
counterparts as less negative than traders not trading with Palestinians. In other words, 
personal contacts and cross-conflict-networks seem to offset the predominantly negative 
stereotypes caused by the rifts of the conflict. Therefore, we find robust evidence to support 
the fact that economic interactions at an informal and non-official every-day level can provide 
one effective way to diminish or even overcome political division and societal alienation, 
which otherwise lead to mistrust, reservations and prejudices created and spread due to the 
political conflict.  
 
Israeli traders perceive a continuous deterioration in the conditions needed to establish and 
maintain business links to Palestinians. Nonetheless, the traders with current contacts are 
significantly less pessimistic towards the future. In comparison to the perspectives of 
Palestinian wholesalers (WFP 2009), various asymmetries are discernible. In contrast to their 
Palestinian counterparts, Israeli wholesalers perceive low effects of the conflict on their 
businesses. They are, nevertheless, strongly in favour of a quick resolution of the conflict, 
whereby they value the societal benefits slightly higher than their own. In accordance with the 
asymmetries found Israelis have limited knowledge about the transport of goods to the 
Palestinian Territories and the related problems. This difference in the level of problems 
perceived may be recorded as the first aspect of asymmetry. 
 
A second aspect of asymmetry regards the lack of access for Israeli traders to the Palestinian 
Territories, which is particularly severe for Jewish Israelis. This implies a high level of 
uncertainty, as Israeli traders have no measures towards their debtors in case of payment 
default. On the other hand, Israeli traders have no possibility to buy possibly cheaper 
Palestinian products on Palestinian markets resulting in a sub-optimal market outcome for 
Israeli traders. Most trading relations with Palestinians originate in the two largest Israeli 
wholesale markets and are connected to the population centres in the north, centre and south 
of the West Bank. While Gaza is mainly connected to Tel Aviv, Israeli traders from Jerusalem 
and northern Israel mainly interact with the closest Palestinian regions. Trade takes place in 
an informal way with Israelis mostly selling while their Palestinian counterparts usually care 
for the transport of the goods.  
 
This study provides a micro-level analysis of Israeli-Palestinian cooperation despite violent 
conflict. We find evidence that strongly supports the liberal theory of peace (ONEAL AND 
RUSSET 1997). Existing economic interdependencies between Israelis and Palestinians 
improve the perception of their business counterparts on the other side of the conflict and lead 
to less pessimistic expectations about the future. Our field study evidence furthermore 
confirms the findings of GEORG et al. (2013) who observed under lab conditions that personal 
contacts between Israelis and Palestinians lead to improved cooperation.  
 
 
Trading relationships that are established due to economic incentives facilitate professional 
and social contacts linking both conflicting parties in everyday life. These relationships 
potentially counter-act segregation and decrease the conflict potential. The results also show 
that the prolonged conflict creates obstacles to trade and welfare losses for both parties 
involved, which can only partly be overcome by personal contacts. This implies substantial 
potential for increasing trade between both sides of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and 
realizing mutually beneficial gains from specialization. It represents one example of an 
effective informal grass-roots approach to reducing societal alienation and promoting 
rapprochement beyond official political negotiations. During the last decades, political 
negotiations have not resulted in sustainable tangible improvements of the conflict-induced 
hardships for either side. Pragmatic economic contacts are likely to be most robust against 
political abuse because the actions of the agents involved in such economic exchange are 
mainly driven by business considerations instead of polarised political and ideological 
perspectives. 
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